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TEMPTING GOD
Brian Leftow

Western theism holds that God cannot do evil. Christians also hold that Christ
is God the Son and that Christ was tempted to do evil. These claims appear to
be jointly inconsistent. I argue that they are not.

It is standard Western theism to hold that God not only does no evil, but is
impeccable—unable to do evil. For Christians, one prominent root of this
claim is James 1:13, which states that
1. God cannot be tempted by evil.
Yet the New Testament also poses a puzzle for divine impeccability. It
teaches that
2. Christ is God the Son.
Hebrews 4:15 states that
3. Christ was tempted in all ways as we are.1
And
4. One way we are tempted is by evil.2
(2)–(4) seem inconsistent with (1). They also seem inconsistent with divine
impeccability. How can someone impeccable be tempted to do evil? How
could God be tempted to do something He cannot do? After all, I cannot
be tempted to make it the case that 2 + 2 = 5.
I now argue that a deity unable to do evil can be tempted by evil if
incarnate. I first explicate (1), giving a partial account of what it is to be
tempted. There is a moral as well as a modal problem about Christ’s temptations; I develop that next. I then offer three accounts of how Christ could
be tempted and argue that despite His inability to give in, Christ was morally responsible for resisting temptation.
1
The terms translated “tempted” in the James and Hebrews texts have the same Greek root,
making the tension between them quite explicit. (My thanks here to Hugh Benson.)
2
It can be morally good to bring about evil, if that evil is the least bad of one’s options. I
speak throughout of evil it is not morally good to bring about. One can be tempted to bring
about states of affairs that really would be evil, or that it would really be evil to bring about,
or that one believes would have one of these properties, or any combination of these. In
what follows the difference between these does not matter, so I speak of temptation to evil
indifferently.
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Temptation
I begin by explicating (1). Its “cannot” opens the (1)-sentence to multiple
interpretations: it might express many modalities, de dicto or de re. Plausibly James had no inkling of this, and nothing in the text hints at what he
might have said had he known. But a great many modally precise claims
the (1)-sentence can express make it hard to see how (1)–(4) can be consistent.3 So we need not linger over this. Let us instead focus on what it is to
be tempted.
“Macbeth was tempted” can report what the witches did to him: they
deliberately brought a state of affairs to mind in order to arouse his desires
and thereby produce a course of action. If you accept (2) and believe that
the Temptation stories report actual events in literal terms, you should not
read (1) as denying that someone could tempt God to evil in this sense.
Even if you don’t read the Temptation stories that way, surely nothing
kept anyone from doing this to Christ, so charity forbids taking (1) and (2)
to imply that no-one could have done so.
“Macbeth was tempted” could also report his meeting a situation noone deliberately offered, which brought to mind a state of affairs apt to
arouse his desires and thereby produce a course of action, e.g., seeing an
accidentally-dropped wallet lying on the ground. That counts as apt to
produce the relevant desires because it is the sort of thing that often does
so. We surely should not take (1) and (2) to imply that Christ could not
have seen a dropped money-bag.
Finally, “Macbeth was tempted” could report his entering or being in
an inner state, a state of temptation, henceforth being tempted. James, I
submit, makes a claim about God’s inner state: with respect to doing any
evil, He cannot be in this condition. We ought to read texts charitably, and
this is the only reading on which this text makes a plausible claim.
It would be nice if we could treat (1) by setting out what James thinks
it is to be tempted. But if James had any view of this, the text does not reveal it. So we can only seek the most charitable reading—i.e., suppose that
James meant to speak of whatever being tempted really is, and ask what
being tempted really is. My purposes here don’t require a full analysis of
this. I can make do with some of its necessary conditions.4 If I am tempted
to eat a cookie,
–

I am considering a state of affairs—my experiencing the pleasure of
eating the cookie.

3
There is a problem if God is tempted in no metaphysically possible world, but equally
if He is tempted only in no physically possible world, given that we live in a physically
possible world. If we take the necessity as de re, the problem is obvious. If it is de dicto, the
individual who is God can be tempted only if this individual can cease to be God—and it is
fairly plausible that anything divine would be eternally divine by nature.
4
Here I’m indebted to suggestions by Alfred Mele and the Editor.
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–

I occurrently want it to obtain. If I did not want this, the state of
affairs could not draw me toward doing anything. If having dispositional desires sufficed for being tempted, I could be tempted to eat
in dreamless sleep, with nothing going on that is in any way related
to eating or feeling pleasure. If I merely have a standing disposition
to want the pleasure or an inclination to obtain it, I merely have a
standing disposition or inclination to be tempted by it. I am not actually tempted by it.

–

there is a type of act I believe would bring it about, namely eating
the cookie.

–

I occurrently want to do an act of this type.

–

I also have something against eating the cookie, which is actually
rendering me somewhat ambivalent about whether to eat it. If I did
not, eating the cookie would not be something I am tempted to do. It
would simply be something I want to do. I want to continue writing
right now, but it would be strange to say that I am tempted to do so,
because nothing in me resists it. I have no hesitation to overcome.
I just plain want to write. A state of temptation essentially involves
wanting to do the act one has in view, but also wanting or having
some resolve not to do it. Thus in particular an act’s being wrong
is not enough to make wanting to do it constitute being tempted
to do it. If I am wholeheartedly in favor of doing a wrong act, I am
not tempted to do it. I simply want to do it.5 Only if something in
me opposes it can I be tempted to do it. The opposition cannot be
trivial, either. Suppose the only thing in me opposing doing wrong
were a weak impulse or an intention I do not feel strongly drawn to
maintain. That is, suppose I were almost wholeheartedly for it. Then
I wouldn’t be tempted to do wrong either. I would simply be for it,
but with a slight hesitation. For my desire to do evil to count as a
temptation, I must be significantly invested in not doing it. Whatever
I have against doing it must be sufficiently forceful or important
(etc.) to create at least some genuine ambivalence.

–

suppose that whenever I start to want to eat the cookie, there is always something else I want to do much more, doing which is incompatible with eating it, and so I never take eating the cookie seriously.
Though I want the cookie, then, eating it is never a live option. If this
is so, then even though at times I satisfy all the conditions above,
it would be odd to say I was ever really tempted to eat the cookie,

5
This is true even if a deliberately offered tempting situation induced the want. The
witches tempted Lady Macbeth by tempting her husband, but she was not merely tempted
to have Duncan killed. She wholeheartedly wanted it done. Further, an act’s being wrong or
evil is not a necessary condition of being tempted to do it. I can be tempted to do a dumb
stunt it is not evil or wrong to do. It may not even be unvirtuous, as the prudence it offends
against need not be the moral sort.
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even in a minor way. So to constitute a temptation, a desire to act
must be salient: strong enough and so-related to other desires as to
make doing what that desire is a desire to do a live option. Despite
the salience condition, however, a desire need not be conscious to
be part of a state of temptation.6 I may not be aware that I want to
be admired, nor that this is drawing me to do a foolhardy stunt,
nor that I even want to do the stunt. All the same, I could be being
tempted to do the stunt. If it sounds odd to say that an unconscious
desire can pose a temptation, consider that one way we can fail to be
aware that we want something is by deceiving ourselves.7 Where a
desire shames us, for instance, we may hide it from ourselves—and
shameful desires can pose the biggest temptations. Thus temptation
can be both unconscious and morally significant.
So being tempted involves at least two desires, wanting a state of affairs to
obtain, and wanting to do some act(s) to bring it about. Merely wanting to
feel cookie pleasure is not enough to be tempted. Temptation is to do or not
do something (if only give rein to some emotion), and so being tempted
takes wanting to do something, namely eat the cookie. If Noble, a good
person in deep debt, is offered money to commit murder, Noble might refuse and later say, “I wanted the money badly. But I had no desire at all to
commit murder. In fact the thought repelled me. So though I wanted the
money, I was not at all tempted.” This could (I submit) be a correct report
of not being tempted, not of overcoming temptation. Finding the state of
affairs I have the money attractive does not entail being tempted to do what
it takes to bring that state of affairs about. As there was nothing attractive
about murder, Noble did not want to do the act needed to obtain the money;
as a result, there was just no temptation, though Noble wanted the money.
Someone who is tempted does not just want to have what is offered, but
also to some extent inclines to satisfy that want, i.e., has some desire to act.8
Our necessary conditions for being tempted yield a plausible suggestion about why (1) is true.9 God has desires.10 He can want states of affairs
Pace A. T. Nuyen, “The Nature of Temptation,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1997), 96.
In whatever way self-deception is possible.
8
The two desires could in principle have the same object: the state of affairs I desire to
obtain might just be that I do an action. Even so, it is one thing to desire that an act be done
by me, and another to want to do it. If I am severely agoraphobic, I may desire that an act of
going outside be done by me—I might wish I could go outside—but all the same be so fearful
that I do not want to go outside. I might not be motivated to go outside at all. An action-desire, a want-to-do, has to include some motivation to act. (For the concept of an action-desire,
see Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 16.)
9
I cannot call it more than a plausible suggestion because I have not claimed that the
conditions are jointly sufficient for being tempted. As I leave it open that there may be other
conditions, I must allow that some further condition I have missed might provide a better
explanation. If you think my conditions jointly sufficient, you can take this as the only available explanation.
10
Or their functional equivalents. Swinburne insists that God has no desires, but acts only
from purely rational considerations (Richard Swinburne, The Christian God [Oxford: Oxford
6
7
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to obtain and want to act.11 If there are reasons against actions, as omniscient He knows them. It is possible that He have enough reason to act to
make an act a salient option for Him, but enough reason against to constitute significant pressure against doing it. Thus if (1) is true, plausibly what
must be lacking in God is desire to do an evil act: knowing that it would be
evil to do an act is sufficient for Him not to want to do it.
This has consequences. Necessarily, if an act would be evil, God knows
this. Necessarily, if He knows this, He does not want to do it. So God
cannot want to do an evil act. If He cannot want to do evil, He could do it
voluntarily only by a wholly irrational, unmotivated choice, to do an act
He believes He has sufficient reason not to do and which He in no way
wants to do. This would go beyond akrasia. The weak-willed do what
they want to do, despite knowing that they have more reason not to do
it. This would be doing what He does not want to do, despite having no
desire to do it, knowing this, and knowing that He has more reason not to
do it. I’m not sure this sort of sheer perversity is really possible. But in any
event, God cannot act irrationally. If so, then, God can’t do evil voluntarily.
So if God cannot want to do evil, He cannot do it voluntarily.12 So our
explanation of (1) implies that an impeccable God is not free to do evil.13
Further, as omniscient, He knows this. So we can raise another puzzle
about (1)–(4): how could a perfectly rational God be tempted to do something He knows He is not free to do? How could He be tempted voluntarily
to do something He knows He cannot do voluntarily?
The Evil of Temptation
So far, (1)–(4) have raised a modal and a freedom puzzle. I now add a
specifically moral puzzle. Someone impeccable cannot deserve blame.
Being tempted to evil (I shortly argue) is often blameworthy. If Christ was
tempted “in all ways as we are,” He met a normal human life’s worth
of temptations. Could a normal human life include only excusable temptations to evil? I now put this last puzzle in place by considering the
blameworthiness of temptation to evil.
On one main approach to the scope of moral responsibility, we clearly
can be blameworthy for being tempted toward evil. On this approach,
we can deserve moral blame or praise for anything which so expresses
our rational judgments and values that it is “appropriate, in principle, to
University Press, 1994], 66–67). If this is correct, His grasp of relevant reasons serves as the
functional equivalent of having a desire—motivating behavior, producing pro-attitudes, etc.
11
Or (Swinburne again) grasp the relevant reasons and appropriately incline toward action.
12
It should be clear that if Swinburne is right and there are no divine desires, we can
adjust the argument accordingly.
13
Some might argue that if so, He cannot be morally responsible for doing good. I disagree. See my “Necessary Moral Perfection,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989), 240–260,
and “Infinite Goodness,” in The Infinity of God, ed. Benedikt Gocke (University of Notre
Dame Press, forthcoming).
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ask (us) to defend or justify it” on the basis of those.14 On this approach,
we are blameworthy for many states of temptation. If I am tempted to
steal Jones’s million dollars, this is (we can suppose) an outflow of my
underlying bad character and values. It would be appropriate to ask me to
defend wanting to take the money; we might do so to begin to show that
the desire expresses indefensible values. So on the “expressive” account,
my temptation is blameworthy.
On the more usual approach, we can be blameworthy only for things
we can control directly and immediately (e.g., what choices we make) and
things with the right relation to what we can control directly and immediately. So on this account, whether we can deserve blame for being tempted
depends on the relation between being tempted and our control. Being
tempted is primarily a matter of having desires, and so the matter turns
on the extent to which we can control our desires. We usually have little or
no immediate control of desires. A desire shows up whether we want it to
or not; there seems nothing we can do then about its showing up then. But
we have at least two sorts of indirect control of some desires.
Over time, we can affect the desires we involuntarily start to have, by
exposing ourselves to appropriate influences. We cannot immediately
cause ourselves to believe what we wish, but we can alter our beliefs over
the long term by appropriate exposure to evidence and argument. So too,
over time, we can change some of what we want or how we want it. I
could have done something about being tempted to steal Jones’s million.
I could have undertaken a course of moral self-improvement or spiritual
direction. Over time, that might well have weakened my desire to steal or
heightened my feelings against stealing to the point that stealing was no
longer tempting, and could have made me not want to steal at all.
We also have some influence over whether a desire continues unabated.
We can change the focus of our attention. If I am thinking about Jones’s
money, I can make myself think about something else. It isn’t effective to
tell myself not to think about Jones’s money. We all know that this will
cause such a thought. But I can just move on, and if the money continues
to pop back to mind, I can just move on again and again. Sometimes the
change sticks. If I manage to stop thinking about Jones’s money, I at least
demote my desire for it from conscious and salient to unconscious and
less-salient. This might stop my being tempted. I can only say “might”
because an unconscious desire can figure in a state of temptation. But
plausibly a temptation demoted to unconsciousness is often lesser and
14
Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” Philosophical Studies
138 (2008), 369. The seminal paper here is Robert M. Adams, “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical
Review 94 (1985), 3–31. For other views of this sort see Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility,
and Moral Assessment,” 367–392, and “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity
in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005), 236–271; T. M. Scanlon, “The Significance of Choice, “ in
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, v. 8, ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press, 1988), 149–216; Gila Sher, “Kantian Fairness,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005), 179–192,
and “Out of Control,” Ethics 116 (2006), 285–301.
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currently less-pressing. Moreover, if I cease to think about Jones’s money
consciously, I might cease to have a specific desire for Jones’s money,
though I may still have a general standing occurrent non-conscious desire
for any money I can get my hands on. My knowledge that Jones has a
million I could grab could so recede into the background that it could be
something like temporarily forgotten.
I directly and immediately control whether I try to affect my desires, I
can try, there is a fair chance that it will work if I try, I am responsible to
try, I can know all this and I am responsible to know it. Let’s suppose that
I knew all that, that I had good reason to think spiritual direction would at
least partly succeed and that in fact, had I worked at it, my desire to steal
would have vanished before I heard about Jones’s money—and yet I did
nothing. Then my desire to steal (or at least its intensity) is blameworthy
on a control-based account, even though I cannot directly and immediately control its occurring.15 If the desire occurs or continues unabated, it
is my fault. So then is my temptation to steal.
Some might say that what deserves blame here is only my voluntary
omission of desire-altering measures: that the temptation itself is regrettable, a moral flaw, perhaps a sign of vice, but not strictly blameworthy. But
if something happens due to my omission, it is my fault that it happens.
If I am piloting a ship, I leave the wheel (omitting to control the ship), and
the ship then runs aground, the grounding is my fault. We deserve blame
for things that are our fault, even if our contribution to their happening
is only a crucial omission. I might deserve censure merely for leaving the
wheel, but I deserve more if the ship actually runs aground. So I deserve
blame for being tempted if I contribute the crucial omission to this.
Suppose I learn to read minds. I read yours. I burst out with a shock,
“you’re lusting after my wife!”16 I am not just expressing anger and
protest. I’m blaming you for your desire. I’m treating it as your fault, as
something for which I legitimately rate you lower as a moral agent. I could
continue, “it’s wrong of you to lust after her: stop!” In this I would follow
Christ, who held that lust is adultery in the mind—that is, a sin. Lust is
a desire. You have no immediate voluntary control of it. But still, you are
responsible not to lust, and your lusts are your responsibility even if they
begin involuntarily. Lusting after my wife may well constitute part of a
state of temptation to do evil. So lust can provide a case of blameworthy
temptation. The more cases one can generate, the more severe the specifically moral puzzle, because the less likely it seems that a normal human
life could involve only blameless temptations.
15
This is just a rough, broad-brush account of a control-based sufficient condition for
blameworthiness. It may be controversial even within the control-based camp and even
apart from the issue about luck I go on to raise. But I need not tweak it further; if the luck
problem can be handled, any plausible tweaks would not affect my main point, which is just
that on control-based accounts of responsibility, sometimes being tempted is blameworthy.
16
To get a “clean” case, suppose that you are not currently even trying to control yourself.
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The Luck Objection
My claims court an objection from moral luck. Having moral luck consists
in having factors outside your control affect what you wind up praise- or
blameworthy for.17 If you are blameworthy for being tempted and you
have no direct control over what desires you begin to have, it is bad moral
luck to meet a situation that prompts a temptation-constituting desire, and
then to have the desire. Some theorists of moral responsibility deny the
existence of moral luck, arguing that anything subject to luck is ipso facto
not our responsibility.18 If this is correct, then if it is luck that the ship runs
aground or that I meet a situation that causes a temptation-constituting
desire, I am not blameworthy for either.
Moral luck comes in importantly different varieties.19 The varieties raise
different issues, and I cannot fully discuss even one sort in a paper primarily about something else. All I can do now is briefly argue the existence
of moral luck due to consequences of our acts or omissions. Suppose I pull
a pound from my wallet, intending to help Beggar 1. Beggar 2 is near, and
is stronger than either I or 1. 2 can knock 1 down, seize the pound from
me and run off. If 2 tries, 2 will succeed. I do not control whether 2 tries.
So I do not control whether I succeed in helping 1. If I succeed, it is just
good moral luck that I help 1; I happened to find 2 feeling placid. Yet I
deserve praise for helping 1 even if 2 is near. For I would have deserved
praise for this had 2 been nowhere near, and the mere fact that 2 is near
can’t make my act non-praiseworthy. If I deserve praise for it, I am morally
responsible for it. So luck about the consequences of my attempt to help
1 affects what it is that I am morally responsible for: there is this sort of
moral luck. Another way to make the same point: my luck about 2 determines whether I am responsible for helping 1 or only for attempting to
help 1. Moral luck opponents would typically bite the bullet here and say
that I am not responsible for helping 1, but only for attempting to do so.20
But taken consistently, this position removes completed actions altogether
as objects of moral evaluation. It removes even bodily attempts, since it is
just good moral luck that my body functions well enough just then to let
me pull the pound from my wallet. The position limits moral evaluation
to character and intention. I suggest that this is too radical a surgery on
the subject matter of ethics to accept.21 Another move might be to say that
I deserve praise for helping a beggar, but not for helping 1 in particular.
17
For the general issue, see Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck, ed. Daniel
Statman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 57–72.
18
See e.g., Michael Zimmerman, “Luck and Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 97 (1987), 374–
386, and “Taking Luck Seriously,” Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002), 553–576.
19
See Nagel, “Moral Luck.”
20
See e.g., Zimmerman, “Luck and Moral Responsibility,” and “Taking Luck Seriously.”
21
As I’ve indicated, a great deal more should be said here. Ultimately, in regard to moral
luck, we have a genuine conflict between strong intuitions about responsibility. There is no
easy, cost-free solution to it. I hope to argue elsewhere that the cost of rejecting consequential
luck is greater than the cost of admitting it.
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This seems paradoxical: the only thing I did to earn praise for helping a
beggar was help 1.
We can deserve praise or blame for things we do not directly and immediately control, if they bear the right relation to things we do so control.
It may be bad moral luck that I meet something that provokes a desire
that then constitutes a state of temptation toward evil, but I submit that if
the conditions above are met, I am blameworthy for the desire’s and the
temptation’s occurring.22 I now take up approaches to (1)–(4).
The Ambiguity Approach
One can render (1)–(4) consistent by taking “tempt” to be ambiguous in
(1) and (3). (1), I’ve argued, concerns God’s inner state. On a legitimate alternate translation, Hebrews 4:15 tells us that Christ “was tested in all ways
as we are.” That a test occurred is a matter of His external circumstances,
not His internal state: contradiction averted. Trying to scratch a diamond
tests its hardness even if it is physically impossible that the diamond fail
the test. Still, I do not think we can rest with this. Even if we can tame
the Hebrews verse, we still have the puzzle of how Christ responded to
those tests, given His divine character, and whether those responses are
enough like ours to undergird Hebrews’s further claim that He is humanly
sympathetic with our tests. Henceforth, then, I read (3) as making inter alia
claims about Christ’s internal state. I now offer three ways to understand
that state.
The State-desire Approach
My first says that (3) makes two claims. One is that Christ met things that
typically induce states of temptation in humans, in an amount and variety
somewhere in the normal range for a human life. So He was tested in all
ways as we are: by the same things that test us. (3) also asserts that when
He met these, Christ had in many cases the very types of state-desires we
have when we are tempted: He was also tested by human nature, as we
are. But on my first way to understand Christ’s inner state, He did not
form the corresponding act-desires, and (3) does not say that He did.23 So
my first suggestion adds to the ambiguity approach: (3) says that Christ
was tested, but also makes a claim about Christ’s inner state, that He had
certain state-desires but not certain act-desires.
Suppose that He did not. Then He had something like states of temptation, but not states of temptation strictly speaking. Still, these state-desires
pressed Him toward wrongdoing as they do us. It is this pressure, the
felt force of the state-desire, that in us often produces an act-desire. It’s
Or at least for its occurring with its full intensity, depending on the facts of the case.
Having state-desires for evil states or states it would be evil to bring about does not
constitute wanting to bring them about (they are not act-desires) or being willing so to act
(one can have a state-desire but be unwilling to do anything about it) or consenting to any
degree to acting so (one can have a state-desire but have no desire to bring about the state
in question).
22
23
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because I first want it to be the case that I experience cookie-taste that I
then want to eat the cookie. If I do form the latter desire, I now have two
wants, not one, for two things, not one. But at least part of the motive
force of the act-desire is just the transmitted force of the state-desire. We
can see this as follows. Suppose I want to experience cookie taste, I thus
want to eat the cookie, and the only reason I want to eat it is that I want
to experience cookie-taste. (I’m not hungry. Eating is not a hobby. Etc.)
If eating attracts me only as a way to experience cookie taste, eating and
experiencing cookie taste do not seem better to me than just experiencing
cookie taste, or have more motive force to me than the latter alone does. If
the only reason I want to eat is to experience cookie taste, then for me it is
as if the eating has no intrinsic value, but only an extrinsic value entirely
derivative from experiencing cookie taste. If this is so, the motive force
of my desire to eat cannot be greater or less than the motive force of my
desire to taste, nor can the motive force of the two desires together be
greater than that of the desire to taste. So the desire to eat simply transmits
the force of the desire to taste. Thus I am not under more psychological
pressure to eat than I would be if I just wanted to experience the taste,
knowing that if I eat the cookie, I will taste it.
This shows that in ordinary cases, part of an act-desire’s motive force
is just the motive force of the state-desire(s) for the state(s) the act would
bring about. Now in ordinary cases, we may also value doing the act,
not just the state(s) the act brings about. But even in this case, motivation
really comes from state-desires. If I want to do the act due inter alia to
something about the doing of it, the state-desire that I be doing the act or
enjoying whatever value the doing brings is distinct from the act-desire
to do it, and the act is to realize the state, i.e., satisfy the state-desire. We
act to bring about states of affairs. So act-desires’ motive force just is the
force of the state-desires that beget them. They transmit the force of statedesires. They do not add to it. Compare: means are for the sake of ends. So
the motive force of means is just the motive force of the ends they serve,
and if the means seem to have motivational force of themselves, that is
because the using of the means has become partly an end itself. If all this is
correct, then even if nothing produced in Christ any act-desire to do evil,
if the inducements He met produced the appropriate state-desires, they
pushed Christ to do evil precisely as hard as they would have pushed us.
And so Christ was tested in all ways as we are, in the sense that things
that psychologically press us toward evil pressed Him toward evil just as
hard.24
Some might object that if Christ has no act-desire to make food, the
Devil’s mention of obtaining bread exerts no psychological pressure.25 But
this just seems wrong. Christ is hungry. He feels hunger-pain. He has a
24
Again, the Greek root here, “peirazw,” can be translated “test” as well as “tempt.” Pressure tests even if it does not strictly tempt.
25
So one referee.
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state-desire that the state of affairs I am fed and not in pain be actualized:
that is, He wants to be fed and pain-free. He knows that He can make food
and that if He makes it, He can eat it. The want to be fed and pain-free
might well intensify when the Devil directs His attention toward it, bread
comes to mind and this knowledge becomes psychologically salient. That
is plenty of pressure to make food. Wanting the end produces psychological pressure to take the means. Wanting to be fed produces psychological
pressure to get food. Act-desires do not add psychological pressure to do
a dirty deed. They just take us one more step down the road toward doing
it: we desire the means (doing the act) as well as the end (being in the
state the act will produce). If act-desires merely transmit the psychological
force of the related state-desires, a desire to take the means—i.e., to do
what will bring about the desired state—is not an independent source of
psychological pressure.26 Christ does not come to want to make food, but
He does want food, and that presses Him to make it. Earlier I said that
Noble, repelled by murder, was not tempted to accept the money. But
Noble wanted the money badly. That did press him to accept it. Aversion
kept the state-desire from producing an act-desire, but the state-desire
was fierce (we can suppose), and made worse by the offer. A fierce desire
is psychological pressure to have what the desire is for. Pressure to have
the end is pressure to use the means, even if it doesn’t produce a desire to
do so.
On the present picture, Christ resists temptation at an earlier point than
we usually do: that is, He aborts the move toward a bad act at a logically
and perhaps temporally prior point. Inducements tend to lead us to actdesires; if they do and we resist, we resist satisfying these. On the present
picture, Christ resists even forming the act-desire.27 He not only resists
doing what it takes to have what tempts, He resists wanting to do what
it takes. Temptation presents Christ an inducement not just to act, but to
want to act; He resists even the want. It presents Christ an inducement to
be tempted; Christ resists being tempted. This isn’t what we do when we
resist temptation—we are tempted and resist doing what we’re tempted
to do. But it is different because it is a more complete moral achievement.
26
Suppose I want to have Jones’s million and so form an act-desire, to steal it. Stealing
may attract me also because I enjoy it. But that increment of motive force arises because of
an associated state-desire: I want it to be the case that I feel the pleasure of stealing. Stealing
tempts me because of more than one state-desire, not because an act-desire has a motive
force of its own to contribute. Here many state-desires lead to the forming of an act-desire
which transmits their joint force.
27
It should not sound odd to speak of resisting forming an act-desire. We can do this
ourselves; we can resist forming sexual act-desires, for instance, by simply not looking at
certain things, or by changing our attention as quickly as we can, or by forcing our thoughts
into another path. Thus we can be blamed for not doing so, and Catholic moral theology
makes “lingering delectation” of an occasion for such desires itself a sin (so e.g., Aquinas,
ST II:1, 74, 6). It may sound odd to say that Christ resists doing something He cannot do. (It
did sound odd to the Editor.) But this (I submit) gets things backward. Christ cannot do it
because it is His nature to resist it.
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On the present picture, then, (1)–(4) are compatible. God cannot be
tempted: He cannot form act-desires to do evil. Nor can Christ. (3) speaks
of testing, not tempting, and its “in all ways” makes a claim about external inducements, state-desires and degree of psychological pressure.
Christ could be psychologically pressed to do something He knew He was
not free to do, somewhat as a prisoner can be psychologically pressed to
leave jail; He can be pressed to do what He cannot do, as a diamond can
be pressed to scratch.28 If Christ never formed the necessary act-desires,
He never entered a full state of temptation, though He had something
functionally similar. Thus there are no blameworthy states of temptation
to worry about. There may be a residual worry about blameworthy statedesires. I address this below.
Restricted Temptation
My first approach makes Christ’s inner life distinctly different from ours.
Some might prefer to see Him as more like us. So here is another way to
deal with (1)–(4): let Christ enter into genuine full states of temptation, but
take a weak reading of (3), on which its “all” does not range over all, or
all sorts, or even a representative sample of sorts, of temptations humans
face. If we want to restrict Christ’s states of being tempted to those for
which He is not blameworthy, but allow Him temptations toward evil,
we will want to show that He is not blameworthy for these. There are
two broad views of the scope of moral responsibility. They agree on some
classes of blameless temptation. We might therefore consider restricting
Christ’s being tempted toward evil to cases that fall in these classes.
On the most common sort of view, one is morally responsible only for
what either is under one’s direct, immediate control or bears some appropriate relation to what one so controls. Suppose, then, that our desires are
blameworthy only if they bear some appropriate relation to our control—
e.g., only if our prior voluntary actions could have controlled them without
unreasonable effort. If that’s true, we often can’t be blamed for wanting
what we want, even when they are bad wants to have, because there is
nothing we have omitted to do which could have led by reasonable effort to
our not having those desires. Perhaps the desires in Christ’s states of temptation were always of this sort. He may have been tempted in the Garden to
avoid the Cross: if He was, desires to stay alive or avoid pain would have
animated this. If these can be extirpated at all, the effort involved would
surely be unreasonable in itself, and a fortiori because the result would
arguably not be a good state to be in. But I suspect that these desires are
just natural to humans, and so unavoidable. In the Temptation narrative,
the Devil whispers, “If you are the Son of God, tell these stones to become
bread” (Matthew 4:3). If this produced a state of temptation, that was due
to desire for food. That desire is surely natural and was unavoidable by
28
And He can resist doing what He cannot do, as a diamond can resist scratching: it
cannot be scratched because it is its nature to resist that sort of pressure.
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any reasonable purely human means then open to Him.29 Jesus takes the
challenge to jump off the Temple pinnacle as tempting Him to test God’s
provision for Him. Desire not to be in pain and to be fed would have animated any temptation Christ had in the desert to think that God might not
always be providing for Him, and so any temptation to test this. The last
desert temptation was an offer of power and glory. The desire to aggrandize
oneself and lord it over others is likely part of our simian inheritance, again
a matter beyond our control. So the temptations of which a Christology
must take explicit account can be handled in this way.
The “expressive” account also allows this move. For desires one cannot
help having do not depend on one’s rationally-adopted values in any distinctive way: I will want to eat if I fast no matter what my convictions.
Thus these desires do not express any value dependent on my rational
judgments. It is not appropriate to ask me to rationally defend wanting
to eat. Desires like this express values resistant to rational judgment or
criticism: I will want to eat when hungry even if I tell myself not to do so,
and this involves placing a value on eating, even if it is one against which
a second-order desire or a judgment incline me.
The “expressive” approach raises another issue, as it allows that statedesires that reflect corrupt values can be blameworthy even if beyond
control. Well, it’s no stretch to suppose that Christ had no corrupt values.
He was perfect in virtue. So (for instance) He was perfectly loving and
merciful. That is not compatible with (say) placing a high value on torturing animals. Christ’s suite of perfect virtues, then, plausibly would rule
out bad values. But suppose He had had some. Christ might still have
been blameless for the related desires and any relevant temptations in
two ways, even on the “expressive” approach. Consider a case of corrupt
values: suppose that because you were brought up in the Hitler Youth,
you have a state-desire for the extermination of the Jewish race.30 To me, it
is one thing for this desire to be a defect, something to regret, and another
for it to be a fit subject for blame. Suppose that you have no act-desire to
help exterminate Jews, and have tried your best but failed to eliminate
that state-desire: or suppose that you do have the act-desire and have
similarly tried and failed. You just cannot manage to do anything about
either. Then I submit that these desires are something like a moral disability imposed by your upbringing—and it is not right to blame people
for their disabilities. If Christ limited Himself on earth to what He could
accomplish through His human powers and by whatever prayer would
29
We can now deliberately avoid appetite by taking pills; a first-century Jew did not
have that option. Perhaps first-century Jews knew that certain illnesses suppressed appetite
and knew enough to be able to bring these on voluntarily. But that would not have been a
reasonable means, because there was a fairly high likelihood that the resulting state—nearstarvation plus a (further?) illness—would be worse than near-starvation plus hunger. In
any case, if the Spirit’s intent were to have the Son fast and be tempted by desire for food,
avoiding the desire by deliberately becoming ill would have been disobedience.
30
The illustration is Robert M. Adams’s.
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unleash, He could find Himself with this sort of state-desire; liability to
disability is part of being human. Suppose on the other hand that you
could work to eliminate those desires, but have not, due to non-culpable
ignorance about the need or the possibilities for improvement. In this
case you are excused. Your condition is regrettable, but your values are
an imposed disability you inculpably do not know you can help. If you inculpably do not know that your sickness is curable, it is not right to blame
you for continuing to be ill. If Christ while on earth limited His access to
knowledge to whatever His human nature and prayer could provide, He
could find Himself with this sort of state-desire. This exculpation extends
to any state of temptation these state-desires produce.
My second approach to Christ’s temptations, then, asserts that all
state-desires that press Him toward temptation and evil, and all His temptations, are blameless in one of the ways just sketched. This gives Him
access to a representative range of human states of temptation, and lets
Him enter them fully, not just stop short with state-desires. But it keeps
His moral record clean. The price? Perhaps just a closer look at James. Here
is the James text in context:
When tempted, no one should say, “God is tempting me.” For God cannot
be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone; but each one is tempted when
he is dragged away and enticed by his own evil desire. Then after desire has
conceived, it gives birth to sin, and sin . . . to death. Don’t be deceived . . .
Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of
the heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows. He chose
to give us birth through the word of truth, that we might be . . . firstfruits of
all he created.31

I read this as follows: God, who cannot be tempted, does not tempt to
evil. Rather, He sends only good things [and so not temptation to evil].
Constancy is part of His character. As it is and He has chosen to send the
good of new birth, planning to make us firstfruits, He will not so change
as to lead us away from Him instead by tempting us to evil. The key point
for present purposes is that the whole passage concerns the same being,
the God who cannot be tempted, who is also referred to as the Father. The
Father never was incarnate. Read in context, then, though the James text includes a sentence that would normally assert (1), James asserts not (1) but
1*. God unincarnate cannot be tempted by evil.
(1) is not compatible with my thesis that God incarnate can be tempted by
evil, when it is blameless to be so. (1*) is. It is also obviously compatible
with (2)–(4), which concern either us or God incarnate.
Complications of Incarnation
Let us now consider a third way to deal with (1)–(4). (1) makes a claim about
God apart from the Incarnation. The Incarnation introduces complications.
31

James 1:13–18.
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To explain them I must say a bit about act-individuation. There are finerand coarser-grained approaches to individuating actions. The finer the
grain, the closer we get to a 1:1 pairing of descriptions with actions: use a fine
enough grain and buttering my parsnips is not the same action as buttering
them quickly. On a coarser-grained approach, these are two descriptions
of a single action. Individuating actions coarsely, the same action can be
tempting under one but not under another description. If I am hungry, it
is tempting to eat the food on that plate, leaving nothing behind. Even if I
am hungry, it is not tempting to eat my wife’s dinner, leaving her nothing to
eat. The one description engages my love and moral knowledge and assures
that no action-desire arises. The other does not engage either and just leaves
my animal nature to assert itself. In what follows I take a coarse-grained
approach. This is purely an expository convenience. When I speak of being
tempted to act under one but not another description, I could make equivalent points in terms of being tempted to do an act doing which entails (in the
circumstances) doing others which are not tempting.
Now to the substantive point about the Incarnation. The orthodox view
is that Christ had His full divine natural endowment while incarnate.
But there has been great disagreement about how He had it, how much
access He had to how much of what He had, and what special graces
God bestowed on Him in His human natural endowment. Suppose that
Christ while on earth prior to the Resurrection had access only to a normal
human sum of knowledge—that while He had no false beliefs, He did not
have the use of some divine knowledge. Suppose that He was then voluntarily operating with one hand tied behind His back cognitively, doing
all His processing with a human brain and only as much information as
that brain could acquire from its environment. Then He could think of
an action under a description and not have His omniscience bring all its
other descriptions to His immediate attention. In particular, He could
think of it under a description which did not make its moral qualities salient, and not have a morally salient description of it also come at once to
mind if this was not blameworthy. Then for the period in which it was not
blameworthy not to have a morally relevant description of the action in
mind, perhaps it would not be culpable to want to do even an evil action.
Ignorance excuses; so does inability to access knowledge one possesses,
which is functionally and morally equivalent to ignorance. By becoming
incarnate, the Son became (so to speak) subject to a glitch due to finite
processing capacity and speed in the human natural endowment to which
He bound Himself. God the Son would not be culpable for enduring this
glitch if He had non-culpable reasons to become incarnate, nor then culpable for cognitive and other consequences the glitch imposes—including
temptation. In fact, morally sufficient reasons to become incarnate would
have to include morally sufficient reasons to suffer temptation, if it is sufficiently likely that if incarnate He would be tempted. Thus if the glitch
alone makes it possible for a pre-Resurrection Christ to be tempted to do
evil, He would not be culpable for being tempted. By becoming incarnate,
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the Son gave up a measure of control over His desires. He let it become the
case that a human natural endowment could force desires on Him before
His divine personality could get into the act. One can be blameworthy
for the consequences of giving up control, as one is for hitting a child
while driving drunk. But whether one is blameworthy depends on why
one gave up control. If one got drunk and drove merely to feel good, one
deserves blame. If one got drunk and drove because someone threatened
credibly to kill two children unless one did, hitting the child is still tragic,
but one is excused for doing so. So it matters that the Son’s reasons for
giving up control be morally praiseworthy, and if they are, perhaps that’s
all we need say.
It is not a psychological impossibility to want or even try to do an action
one cannot do, if one is not thinking of that about it which makes it impossible to do or thinking that anything makes it impossible to do. Perhaps
Goldbach’s Conjecture is false. If it is, no-one can prove it. But as long as
this is unknown, mathematicians will be able to want to prove it and be
tempted to prove it. For being tempted is just a matter of what desires etc.
one has, and as I’ve just noted, one’s desires need not line up with the facts
about one’s abilities. Thus on the “glitch” approach, the pre-Resurrection
Christ could want to do what the unincarnate Son cannot do.
God the Son cannot form a desire to do evil if not incarnate. While
incarnate, He has the attitudes and personality which guarantee this result
if He is not incarnate. But attitudes etc. can manifest differently depending
on the conditions under which they operate. They can if nothing else take
longer to manifest because having to work through a limited human
endowment rather than an unincarnate God’s psychology. Perhaps this
allows the formation of conscious desires to do what are de facto evil acts,
which endure for brief periods while morally salient descriptions of those
acts are on the way to consciousness. If it does, it allows for act-desires the
Son must resist—and will resist once the appropriate bit of His knowledge
is humanly on-line. If this is true, God the Son could indeed be tempted
to do evil just as we can be, at least for brief periods. Christ’s divine personality and attitudes would guarantee that the moral and the dimension
of relation to His Father would quickly come to mind, quickly enough to
forestall a move toward doing any evil. It would also guarantee that He
not want to do any act under a description which made its evil salient.
Here too, then, we replace (1) with
1*. God unincarnate cannot be tempted by evil.
We then take (2)–(4) to point out that the special conditions of the Incarnation permit divine temptation to do evil due to limitations of the Son’s
human nature.32 This works because His reasons for being able to be
32
These limitations make us less able than a perfect being is and render even a perfect
being liable to temptation when under them. Does it follow that being finite in these respects
is an imperfection? If it does, then humans who are not incarnations of divine Persons are
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tempted toward evil excuse Him for being tempted. This third approach
also makes Christ’s temptations blameless, but offers a different reason
they are so and thus lets His temptations involve a wider variety of stateand act-desires.
Is There a Problem about Perfection?
One can raise a question here. Being tempted to do evil can include having
desires it is bad to have. Even if one is not blameworthy for them, they
are moral imperfections. God is morally perfect. A morally perfect being
has no moral imperfections. So perhaps even blameless temptations are
incompatible with Christ’s divine character. I offer three replies to this.
One is that this argument takes the doctrine of divine moral perfection
too far. As I parse it, moral perfection requires perfect virtue and having
no unmet obligations.33 It does not go beyond that. This argument unfairly
moves the goalposts.
Another is that for a God morally perfect if not incarnate to let Himself suffer bad desires while incarnate is lowering Himself for love’s sake.
Doing so is thus actually admirable. If it is, its consequences cannot be
viewed as things it would be better not to suffer in the circumstances, i.e.,
given the reason for which they are suffered. On the contrary, the worse
they are, the more admirable He is for suffering them, and so the better it
is (in one respect) that He suffer them. If I let the crowd pelt me with filth
to earn your freedom, you upon release from jail should see the stains on
my clothing as marks of honor rather than things to sniff at. So too, then,
we might honor Christ rather than downgrade Him for being tempted.
Further, ability and willingness to lower oneself for love may then turn
out to be part of true moral perfection.
One might also answer in terms of a compositional model of the Incarnation. Perhaps the doctrine of divine moral perfection is really with
regard to intrinsic moral qualities. On a compositional model, the Incarnation adds a body and soul to God the Son, composing a three-part whole,
rather than (say) His somehow turning into one or both. On such a model,
imperfections the Son incurred due to composition with the body and soul
of Jesus would be extrinsic—because the body and soul are added to the
Son. Extrinsic bad desires are compatible with perfection in all intrinsic
moral properties.
Freedom, Responsibility and Resisting Temptation
If God cannot do evil, Christ had to resist His temptations. Perhaps the
manner was up to Him, but the result was not. That poses the question of
how His doing so could be free and morally responsible. This is no idle
matter. If it was not, He did not have a freely, responsibly achieved sinless
essentially imperfect beings, even if they are perfect humans. To me that is not an implausible
claim. Surely no human who is not an incarnation of a divine Person is a perfect being.
33
See my “God’s Deontic Perfection,” Res Philosophica 90 (2013), 69–95.
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life to offer to God, and taking Him as a moral exemplar is a bit like taking
a robot as one.
I now suggest that on either main approach to the scope of moral responsibility, Christ is morally responsible for resisting His temptations.
On the “expressivist” account, I am responsible for whatever appropriately expresses my rational judgments, values or character. It does not
matter that I cannot do otherwise; I am responsible because the act is a
genuine outflow (in the circumstances) of my real self. Well, Christ’s resistance was a genuine outflow of His real self, though He could not have
done otherwise. So on this sort of account, He is morally responsible for
not giving in.
I now argue that this is so on a control-based account too. Suppose that
I see a leper and want to bathe his sores, but am paralyzed by disgust. I
want to bathe them. I want to act on that want. But my first-order desire
not to touch sores keeps me from acting; the closer I get to the sores, the
more disgusted I become, and so no matter how much I want to help, I
cannot. Fortunately, I have a Mother Theresa pill. I know that if I take it, I
will be unable to resist bathing the sores of the next leper I see. I am now
fairly far from the leper, and so my disgust is not so intense as to keep me
from acting on my desire to act on my desire to help. So I momentarily
focus only on my desire to help the leper, pushing disgust aside. I take
the pill while gazing at the leper, and presto: leper gets relief. I cannot
do otherwise. The wonders of chemistry and my current sensory input
determine my action. Still, I submit that I am responsible for what I do.
Fully foreknowing what would ensue, I voluntarily made myself unable
to do otherwise. I intended to do the act. I had to make myself unable to
do otherwise in order to act successfully on that intention. So I did so, and
my prior intention—formed when I could do otherwise—governed my
behavior. That I could not do otherwise at the time does not make the act
involuntary or unintentional: I volunteered for it by taking the pill, and it
is because I intended to do it that I took the pill. So my lack of alternatives
does not remove my responsibility. It leaves me praiseworthy. I wanted
to help the leper. I intended to do so. I had the ability to avoid doing so
when I formed the intention and so acted on it as to realize it. The only
thing unusual about my generation of my action is that I passed up my
chance to do otherwise not at the time of the act, but earlier. Why should
that affect how well you think of me for bathing the leper’s sores, if you
know the whole story? Perhaps you will think that I would have been
more praiseworthy had I overcome mounting disgust step by step, with
ever greater difficulty, as I approached the leper. Instead, you may think,
all I overcame was the level of disgust I had when I took the pill. But I
suffered just the amount of disgust I would have suffered otherwise. Further, I overcame it—I kept walking toward the leper—with just the effort I
would have exerted otherwise, with the degree of effort I would have had
in mustering it. It is just that I could not help but exert that effort. That
is how the pill works. In a sense, my suffering was worse: for I suffered
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knowing that I was helpless to turn back and find relief, knowing that
even worse was in the offing and could not be avoided. I let myself in for
this fully foreknowing that I would feel so (we can suppose). In relation
to suffering and overcoming disgust, then, the precise basis for my desert
of praise is nonstandard, but it is not obviously less than in the usual case.
In like manner, God can be responsible for satisfying obligations though
He cannot do otherwise at the time, if He freely chose to make Himself
unable to do otherwise then. His nature requires Him to fulfill His obligations. But it is up to Him whether He takes on any obligation He ever has
to a human. If He does take one on, His doing so is His taking a Mother
Theresa pill. He takes on the obligation to do an act voluntarily, because
He wants to fulfill it, knowing what will ensue, while able to do otherwise.
(He can avoid doing the obligatory act by avoiding the obligation.) He
thus makes Himself unable to refrain from the obligatory act. But as in my
leper case, He is responsible for that act because of the conditions under
which He gave up His ability not to do it.
I now apply this to the Son. I suppose that the Son freely chose to
become incarnate.34 Let’s suppose to simplify discussion that He did so
knowing that if He did, He would face temptation and be unable not to
resist. Even so, He had a choice about whether to resist this temptation.
He had no choice about whether He would resist it if it arose—His nature
settled that. But He had a choice about whether it would arise, and that
was His choice about whether He would resist. He intended to resist. He
voluntarily made Himself unable to do other than resist. He had to make
himself unable not to resist in order to act successfully on His intention.
So He did so, and His prior intention—formed when He could avoid resisting—governed His behavior. That He could not do otherwise at the
time does not make the act involuntary or unintentional. He volunteered
for it by becoming incarnate, and it is because He intended inter alia to do
it that He became incarnate. So His lack of alternatives does not remove
His responsibility. It leaves Him praiseworthy. He wanted and intended to
34
If the sort of freedom involved includes having alternate possibilities of action, this
might require that the Father did not command Him to do so, but instead asked in a way
that left Him able to refuse. But we have no reason to think otherwise. (That He was commanded to submit to crucifixion if incarnate does not entail that He was commanded to
become incarnate.) Still, for the decision to involve ability to refuse the Father’s request, it
must also be the case that the Son’s perfectly loving nature would not compel Him to say yes,
either for love of the Father or for love of us. Son and Father have access to precisely the same
reasons favoring the Incarnation, and the very love of us pushing the Father to ask for the
Incarnation is in the Son pushing Him to do it; further, the Father’s love for and knowledge
of the Son might well preclude His ever asking of the Son something the Son would have
most reason to refuse. How then could it be that the Father could ask this, and the Son
decline? I argue in work in progress that God was able to refrain from creating. If He did
not create, He would not become incarnate. If the Father proposed to the Son a plan which
included creation and the Incarnation, the Son’s ability to decide against creating would also
be an ability to decide against becoming incarnate. That creation and the Incarnation were in
fact tied in God’s providential plan is not a novel theological thought. For an account of how
becoming incarnate can be a responsible act if the Father commands the Son to do it, see my
“Infinite Goodness.”
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resist. He had the ability to avoid doing so when He formed the intention.
He passed up His chance to do otherwise not at the time of the act, but
earlier. If this does not remove praiseworthiness in the leper case, it should
not do so here. For Him, the alternative to resisting is not giving in, but
never having been incarnate. I don’t see why this should affect the point at
issue. Suppose I know that I will give in to temptation if I enter a situation.
I want not to give in. So I make sure I never enter the situation. This is a
legitimate strategy for avoiding giving in, and it leaves me responsible for
not giving in. I use the strategy because I know my sole alternatives are
giving in and not being in the situation, and I want not to give in. For the
Son, the sole alternatives are not giving in and not being in the situation,
and He wants not to give in. If He chooses to be in the situation because
He wants not to give in, how does this leave Him less responsible for not
giving in than I am in choosing not to be there in order not to give in?
On the control-based approach, Christ is derivatively responsible for
not giving in to temptation because He chose freely and with appropriate
knowledge to make Himself unable to give in. If we understand Christ’s
every moral choice on this model, further, this also gives us a way Christ
could have a responsibly achieved sinless life to offer to the Father, despite
His inability to do otherwise.
How Christ Resisted Temptation
Hebrews 4:15 may also imply that Christ responded to His temptations
just as we might. If He did, this is a claim that the actual causal sequence
generating His action contains no interventions by His divine natural
endowment, that He acted only with human power and such help as a
human might in principle have from other divine Persons. Here’s one way
it might have gone. Christ has a 40-days’ hunger, and the Devil tempts
Him inter alia to make some bread. He thinks of bread. His stomach
rumbles; He salivates. He suffers a desire to be fed, or even a desire to
make bread. If Christ was without sin, He suffered these up to, but not to,
the point of culpability, and stopped short. But He does not move even
slightly down the path to bread-making. Either He wants to make bread
only till it comes to mind that this would contravene a divine command
to fast, or He entertains the thought of having bread without inclining
to make bread. The latter is psychologically possible because He always
has uppermost in His mind His relation to His Father, and His Father’s
command to fast: His knowledge that He ought not to eat. His knowledge
of the relevant good is complete, though human. He does not waver in
His focus on it. Love of the Father gives Him the force of will not to be
practically irrational and ignore what He knows, even slightly. So out of
love, He resists that desire, or resists even having that act-desire, in His
resistance drawing on no power that is more than human. That Christ
had a divine nature, the natural endowment of God, does not entail that
this endowment came into play in His resisting sin. While on earth, the
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Son voluntarily foreswore use of His distinctively divine powers.35 He met
temptation only with the resources of His human body and soul. He summoned up reserves of human willpower, out of perfect but human love.
Everything He did, we could do, in much the same way.
Further, it was as hard for Him as for any of us. His desire to be fed
had a certain force. That force required precisely as much counter-force to
resist as it would for us, though perhaps in His case what He is resisting
is the pressure to form an act-desire rather than pressure communicated
through an act-desire. If He drew only on human reserves, it was no easier
for Him to summon up the counter-force than it is for us. If it takes all
the willpower He has in His human endowment, it is no easier for Him
to exercise this than for anyone else, even if perhaps He reaches for it
with greater alacrity. That effort of willpower was resistance. That it had
to succeed does not entail that it was easy for it to succeed, or that it had to
succeed in the way I’m supposing it did, i.e., entirely without aid pumped
in from His divine side.
A hard issue lurks beneath the surface here. Just how much did Christ
have in His human toolkit before the Resurrection, and did it give Him
any advantages in resisting temptation? We will probably never know.
If the goal of the Incarnation is in part to give Adam’s race a chance to
get right what Adam got wrong, it is compatible with this that He have
as much love, knowledge and certainty of the good as an unfallen man
would have—this gives Him no advantages over Adam. If the goal is in
part to give us as we now are an exemplar, one may suspect that the more
Christ had in His toolkit that we do not, the less He meets that goal. Yet
it would be easier to explain His actual sinlessness without drawing His
divine nature into the explanation if He had more in the box than the
average human.36
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35
Save perhaps in working certain miracles; He might e.g., have prayed to the Father with
the result that the Father temporarily let the Son’s own power flow through into His human
nature.
36
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